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Abstract
This paper measures the effect of political integration, such as sharing a national state
or economic union, on the degree of trade integration. Consistently with previous work, we
find large border effects. However, such estimates may be biased and overestimate the effects
of borders because of endogeneity: selection into sharing a political space is correlated with
affinities for trade. We propose a method to address this and to estimate a causal effect. We
then conduct speculative exercises showing the costs and benefits of the changing levels of
integration associated with: the independence of Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country
from the UK and Spain (but remaining within the European Union); the UK’s exit from the
EU; the break-up of the EU itself; and the achievement of frictions between members of the
EU similar to those expected between regions of a single country. We find that the border
effect between countries is an order of magnitude larger than the border effect associated with
the European Union.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of political integration, such as sharing a national state
or economic union, on the degree of trade integration, and to quantify its welfare implications. We
define the economic integration as the causal effect of sharing political space - this is the additional
welfare gained by entities which come together to form a country or an economic union, due to
increased trade.
We calibrate a structural trade model to interregional and international trade data, and obtain
the implicit trade frictions that would explain the observed data, something often referred to as the
Head Ries Index (HRI)1. We do this while treating countries and sub-national units for which we
have data, as entities with the same status within a common framework. The average border effect
is then the average difference between the interregional and the international frictions, controlling
for physical distance, common language, and size. Likewise the average effect of the European
Union is the average difference between frictions within and across the EU boundary, controlling
for those same characteristics. The existence of very large border effects, even within the European
Union, is well known2 and in this paper we also find large average border effects.
Our main point though is that these average border effects are bound to overestimate the gains
from sharing a state. This is because places which share larger affinities are more likely to both
trade with each other and to select into sharing a political space (a country, or EU membership).
Due to this endogeneity the average effect likely overstates the reductions in trade frictions achieved
by sharing a political space.
For instance, the fact that Scotland and England share a country is related to the fact that
they trade a lot - but we cannot claim that the high volume of trade is all caused by the fact of
1According to Head and Mayer (2013), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011) coin the label “Head-Ries
Index” since this “indicator first appears in Head and Ries (2001)”.
2Many papers in the economics of international trade literature have looked at the border effect, starting with
the seminal contribution of McCallum (1995). This empirical work was embedded into the modern trade theory
literature by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who found a substantial border effect that differentiated trade
between U.S. states and Canadian provinces. The theory consistent econometric estimation approach of Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) is what is typically used in this literature, for example Coughlin and Novy (2013) compare
the magnitude on the coefficients of U.S. state-international borders and state-state borders and conclude that
the incremental friction increase is greater when comparing state-state trade to intra-state trade, than it is for
state-international trade to state-state trade. Our results for the average differences between interregional and
international borders are consistent with the estimates from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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state sharing. Scotland and England would trade at a relatively high rate even if they did not
share a country. The affinities that lead to trade between the two also increase the likelihood of
nation state sharing. The causal effect of nation state sharing can be quantified by only changing
the status of state sharing or not - not by also changing these affinities. Looking at the average
difference in trade within and across national borders, even when controlling for physical distance
and common language, does not compare like with like in terms of these affinities. The average
friction between the UK with the rest of the countries of the world, after controlling for physical
distance, size and language, is much larger than the frictions that plausibly would exist between
Scotland and England in the case of independence, even if in that case the frictions were larger
than the ones that we observe today. To impute the difference between the current Scotland-
England frictions with the average frictions that the UK has with other countries as the benefits
of economic integration is likely to overestimate the potential trade benefits of a political union.
Our approach to deal with this endogeneity problem has a certain resemblance to regression
discontinuity analysis. We identify “marginal regions”, defined as regions or countries which seek
to exit the political space under consideration (e.g. Scotland seeking independence from the UK,
or the UK seeking to exit the EU). We also identify “marginal countries”, based on the countries
with the smallest frictions with the country to which the “marginal region” currently belongs (e.g.
Ireland is the natural counterfactual to Scotland with respect to the UK). Essentially “marginal
regions” are regions of a larger country that could conceivably be independent, and “marginal
countries” are independent countries that could easily be regions of the larger country. This
comparison should be clean of the endogeneity problem insofar as the ex-ante probabilities for the
“marginal country” and the “marginal region” to form a political union to the country to which the
“marginal region” belongs, are similar. This comparison gives us our estimate of the causal impact
of sharing political space. Conducting counterfactual exercises based on the difference in frictions
between “marginal region” and “marginal country” allows us to quantify welfare implications.
For example we use the difference between the measured Scotland-rest of the UK friction,
and the measured Ireland-UK friction (because Ireland is observed to have the lowest measured
frictions with the UK) as a measure of economic integration. In addition to having the lowest
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measured friction with the UK, Ireland is similar in size to Scotland, shares a common language
with Scotland and the rest of the UK, is contiguous with the UK (via Northern Ireland), and
shares much common history (including formerly being part of the UK) - and so we observe that
our methodology produces appropriate and interesting counterfactuals.
Another issue that needs to be considered is the potential for regions to substitute integration
with the rest of their country in place of close links with the rest of the world. For the marginal
regions in our analysis, we show that this is not the case and that the frictions that these regions
have with the rest of the world are in line with those of similarly sized countries. In this sense,
economic integration is a gain: it is not achieved at the expense of higher frictions with the rest
of the world.
We conduct speculative exercises to illustrate the quantitative importance of economic integra-
tion. We consider the independence scenarios for Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country,
as well as looking at “Brexit”: the exit of the UK from the European Union. Furthermore we
look at combinations of these such as Scotland staying in the EU by becoming independent as the
rest of the UK undergoes Brexit. Finally, we consider scenarios which look at the disintegration
of the EU, as well as the possibility that the EU furthers its degree of economic integration across
countries to the same level that there is within its member states.
Welfare impacts can easily be quantified following the contribution of Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) who show that the total welfare gains from trade, subject to parameters,
are the same in all trade models within the class of ‘gravity models’, and given by a simple formula3.
The productivity or welfare implications of changes in trade frictions can be examined using policy
experiments, and this has been done in many papers in the literature4. In this paper we evaluate
3Though particular microfoundations are suggestive of particular values for the trade elasticity parameter and
so do matter, a point made by Melitz and Redding (forthcoming). The microfoundations can be very different, e.g.:
a love of variety means that the available product range expands with the size of the market and leads to aggregate
increasing returns to scale, as in Krugman (1980); a larger market can lead to better firm selection as efficient firms
expand to serve this larger market, putting upward pressure on wages, and lowering profitability of low productivity
firms who exit, as in Melitz (2003); and traditional Ricardian trade explanations as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
All imply different structural interpretations, and different values, for the trade elasticity. Simonovska and Waugh
(2013) estimate different values for the trade elasticity based on different structural models. Further, the simple
formula is different for different sub-classes of gravity models: in this paper we use a gravity model with tradable
intermediate goods as discussed in Section IV of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012).
4Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014) is a review of this literature. Examples of papers within this literature
are Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (examines the impact of a drop in all frictions of 5% in a calibrated
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the welfare impacts of changing frictions by the magnitude measured between our marginal regions
and marginal countries as a good estimate of the causal impact of state sharing. We find that,
for all the examples that we look at, the difference for marginal regions in having their measured
interregional frictions and the smallest measured international frictions, accounts for between one
third and one half of the total gains from trade relative to autarky. This is irrespective of the
particular gravity model used (within a subset of the gravity model class), and highly insensitive
to the chosen value for the trade elasticity parameter.
We show that the average econometric estimation exercise (not taking into account the endo-
geneity) over-estimates the causal effect of sharing a country upon economic integration. Neverthe-
less, the value of such economic integration once controlling for this endogeneity is still substantial.
Belonging or not to the EU also has quantitatively significant welfare effects, but these are observed
to be almost an order of magnitude less significant than the impact of sharing a country.
We do not explain the institutional arrangements or mechanisms that lead to economic integra-
tion within countries, we simply identify the size of this integration, and quantify its importance
within a modern general equilibrium model of trade. The differences in the degree of economic
integration may be due to many reasons: biases in government procurement5, home bias in pref-
erences, regulation favouring local firms, political economy biases, migratory patterns, network
formation, etc. In this paper we simply point the facts and leave the investigation of potential
causes to further research6.
* * * * *
We begin our analysis with an illustration showing that something happens within countries
that is different from what happens across countries: the patterns of trade for regions that very
model); and Corcos, Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2012) (examines a number of policy experiments including
undoing non-tariff barrier liberalisations associated with EU membership, implementing 5% tariff barriers on trade
with the world outside EU, and implementing 5% tariffs on all international trade). Head and Mayer (2013) provide
a toolkit for implementing such policy experiments in general equilibrium.
5In a recent paper, Herz and Varela-Irimia (2016) using the universe of public procurement contracts within the
EU show that the nationality of the winner of the contract (the supplier) is its most salient characteristic. The
border effect in public procurement within the EU is enormous, in spite of being explicitly prohibited by the Union
treaties to discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers.
6A recent literature on internal frictions is also helpful in moving forward this research agenda, for example Atkin
and Donaldson (2014), Cosar, Grieco, and Tintelnot (2014), and Ramondo, Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Sabor´ıo-Rodr´ıguez
(2014).
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(a) Trade:GDP ratio of EU countries, plus Scotland,
Catalonia & Basque Country
(b) Herfindahl Index of Trade Concentration of EU
countries, plus Scotland, Catalonia & Basque Coun-
try
Figure 1: Trade and trade concentration in regions and countries
plausibly could be independent countries are very different from those of independent countries.
These regions exhibit a very high degree of trade concentration that marks them out as very
different from otherwise similar countries within the EU. Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque
Country could be countries, but if they were, we would not expect to see their trade patterns
be as shown in Figure 1. These regions, viewed as if they were countries, appear to be highly
integrated into the global economy with a high share of trade in GDP, however this trade is
extremely concentrated with the rest of the country of which they are currently part. Figure
1a7 shows that the trade share of these regions is typical in a European context, but Figure 1b
highlights how anomalous these regions’ trade concentrations are compared with EU countries. It
shows the Herfindahl index of trade concentration8 against GDP on the x-axis, since we may expect
small countries to trade more, and concentrate this trade with their large neighbours. We would
expect regions to have relatively high index values, as they are relatively small, but not nearly as
high as we observe. The regional Herfindahl Indices are much higher than that of the most trade
concentrated independent EU member9: it’s almost an order of magnitude type comparison. Our
exercise will consist of building reasonable counterfactuals for these regions where they appear as
7The data used in for these graphs, and throughout the paper, is described in Appendix A
8If there are N countries, with the exports from country i to country j denoted Xij (X
i
i ≡ 0), then the Herfindahl
Index for country i, Hi =
∑N
j=1[(X
i
j/
∑N
k=1[X
i
k])
2]. Hi = 1 indicates complete concentration of trade with a single
trading partner. Hi → 0 (equality only possible with infinitely many possible trading partners) indicates complete
diversification of trade across all partners.
9The most trade concentrated independent EU member is Austria, a relatively small country which concentrates
its trade with the EU’s largest economy, Germany.
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normal countries.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the Head Ries Index framework
for measuring trade frictions, present our cross country and region comparison results (including
some interesting results on the differences in the degree of home bias between trade in goods and
trade in services), and show the (unsurprising) result that a large border effect exists. Section 3
develops our argument on the endogenous selection of economies into regions and countries - the
average border effect is an upwardly biased estimate of the causal effect of the impact of political
integration upon trade frictions. In this section we also describe our method of dealing with this
selection bias. In Section 4 we conduct counterfactual experiments on regional borders in which
we show that, even after allowing for this selection bias, a substantial causal impact remains. The
value of integration across the European Union is considered in Section 5, in which we provide
some quantification for the costs of Brexit. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Trade Frictions
In this section we show that the border effect, understood as the average difference in bilateral
frictions between interregional and international pairs within the EU, is very large. Furthermore,
the EU border effect, understood as the average difference in bilateral frictions between EU pairs
and other country pairs, is smaller but still significant. Differences of the magnitudes that we
obtain have quantitatively significant welfare implications if they are interpreted as the causal
effect of borders.
We perform a simple econometric exercise, regressing for all pairs of countries and regions, the
Head Ries Index measured for each bilateral pair, against the incomes of each party, the physical
distance between them (and this distance squared), a common language dummy, regional border
dummies, and a non-EU border dummy10. The Head Ries Index (HRI) is the well known indicator
10This is equivalent to running a gravity regression of bilateral trade on GDPs and upon dummies for i and
j, and explanatory terms for trade frictions: lnXij − lnYi − lnYj = αidi + αjdj +  (β1B1 + ...+ βnBn) where
dk is a dummy variable for k, and so αk gives its multilateral resistance, and where  is the trade elasticity and
B1, ..., Bn are n factors with which we try to explain trade frictions. Since δij is a quantity that already incorporates
multilateral resistance, in running ln δij = β1B1 + ...+ βnBn, we are doing the same.
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of trade frictions implied by all gravity models of trade, it is the friction that would produce the
observed bilateral trade within such a gravity model (for a certain trade elasticity). It is a very
natural and theory compatible measure of trade frictions, and has been used many times in the
literature11. It is given by the following expression, where  is the trade elasticity, and it is the
same in all models that produce a gravity equation.
δij =
(
X2ij
XiiXjj
) 1
2
(1)
First we outline the data, and then we describe the results of our exercise.
2.1 Data & Methodology
The data used in this paper is fully described in Appendix A. But briefly it is: international data
from the WIOD database covering both goods and services; regional data for the USA, Canada,
Spain, and Scotland, is taken from local statistical agencies; international, Scottish, and US data
is from 2014; Canadian data is from 2013; Spanish (goods only) and Basque (goods and services)
data is from 2006; and Catalan (goods and services) data is from 2005. The following procedure
is followed to construct an internally consistent dataset:
• From the international data we have: X ij, the trade flow from i to j; the Gross Output, Xi,
and the GDPi, for all countries i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
11Chen and Novy (2012) label this approach to trade friction measurement as the “Indirect Approach”. Other
papers which have used this approach include Head and Ries (2001), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011),
Novy (2013), Chen and Novy (2011), Head and Mayer (2004), and Jacks, Meissne, and Novy (2011). The HRI
between entities i and j is monotonically related to the iceberg cost that appears in many trade models and so is a
measure of the total trade frictions between i and j. The version of the HRI used here is that implied by bilaterally
balanced trade, which is appropriate here because we create a dataset with notional measures of bilateral trade
which imply that all trade is bilaterally balanced.
7
• Then define:
β =
∑
i (Xi −GDPi)∑
iXi
(2)
Xij =
1
2
(
Xji +X
i
j
)
(3)
Xii = Xi −
∑
j 6=i
Xij (4)
Yi = (1− β)Xi (5)
• For each region in our data, we construct a data pair comprising of the region and a virtual
“rest of the country”, by applying the share of income, the share of external trade, and the
ratio of internal trade to external trade, implied by the regional dataset, to the output and
international trade from the country dataset12.
Note that when we try to measure trade frictions consistently across countries and regions and
to conduct some basic statistical analysis on these measures, the US states supply the bulk of our
regional data points. The US and Spanish regional trade datasets are for goods trade only. We
therefore use goods only data for Canada despite goods and services data being available, and we
exclude Scotland from the database at this stage. We use the ratio of, say, Texas goods trade with
the rest of the USA to its goods trade with the rest of the world, combined with the Texan share
of US goods trade with the rest of the world, to generate a consistent measure of Texas’s internal
trade, from the USA’s external combined goods and services trade. Given data limitations, this is a
reasonable procedure. But we can infer in which direction it biases our results from the Canadian,
Basque, and Catalan data, and it seems to matter quantitatively - we will come back to this. In
Section 4 we use goods and services data for Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country13.
12For example, Catalan output is given by Spanish output from the cross-country dataset multiplied by the ratio
of Catalan GDP to Spanish GDP from the regional dataset. Catalan trade with the rest of the world is given by
this Catalan output multiplied by the Catalan external trade to output ratio. Catalan trade with the rest of Spain
is given by this Catalan external trade multipled by the internal to external trade ratio. Finally, the figures for the
rest of Spain are given by the Spanish figures less the Catalan ones.
13It is in itself interesting that out of all the autonomous communities of Spain, the regions with substantial
independence movements, Catalonia and the Basque Country, are the only two with their own local statistical
agencies that produce goods and services data.
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To calculate the HRI for the countries and regions in our dataset, we must choose a trade
elasticity, . There is much discussion in the literature (see e.g. Simonovska and Waugh (2013)
and Melitz and Redding (forthcoming)) about the appropriate value for the trade elasticity, but
based loosely on Simonovska and Waugh (2013), for this exercise we choose  = −3.514. In Section
4 we will reach a conclusion that is extremely insensitive to this choice.
2.2 Average Border Effect Results
We take logs of the set of calculated HRIs and regress against log of gross output, distance, distance
squared, common language and border dummies.
We have three different types of border dummies. The regional border dummy takes value
1 only if it is a border between regions of the same country. The non EU border dummy takes
value 1 only if it is a border between a non EU country and another country (EU or not). Finally,
we include separate dummies for Canadian and Spanish region to region borders to account for
country fixed effects representing differential levels of internal integration between the US, Canada,
and Spain.
These results are shown in Table 1. They suggest that US internal borders are substantially
less frictional than country to country borders within the EU, that Canadian internal borders are
less frictional than US internal borders, and that Spanish internal borders even less so. Moreover,
the borders between two EU countries are 14% less frictional than borders external to the EU
(where external means that at least one of the parties is not an EU member).
Note that the results in this table are highly dependent on the value of the trade elasticity,
though the significance of each factor is insensitive to this parameter.
Figure 2 shows the measured values of the HRI, adjusted for the impact of physical distance
and common language (i.e “log residual delta” is the log of the regression residual plus the impact
of size and borders, and these are graphed against size), separating out the regions-rest of country
14Simonovska and Waugh (2013) who report a range of figures for the trade elasticity based on different trade
models. Their range is from −2.8 given the model from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), to −5.2 given
the Armington model (Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)) or Krugman (1980) model. Our chosen parameter value
is somewhere in the middle of this range and close to the figure of −3.41 which Simonovska and Waugh (2013)
estimate for the Melitz (2003) model.
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Coef.
Constant 4.375843∗∗∗
(0.1017045)
distance in km 0.0001381∗∗∗
(0.00000686)
distance squared −5.65× 10−9 ∗∗∗
(4.18× 10−10)
common language −0.1612534∗∗∗
(0.0362751)
log(XiXj) −0.1097361∗∗∗
(0.0039061)
regional border −0.2100648∗∗∗
(0.0510886)
non EU border 0.1444607∗∗∗
(0.0246778)
Canada −0.2448648∗∗∗
(0.0751898)
Spain −0.4349106∗∗∗
(0.0680727)
Number of obs 984
R-squared 0.7536
Table 1: Regression results of log of δ with trade elasticity = −3.5
pairs, EU country pairs, and other country pairs. As can be seen, the regional frictions are
generally lower than EU frictions, which are generally lower than other country frictions. Figure
2 shows that regions have lower frictions than countries conditional on size. That is, any pair of
countries is expected to have larger bilateral frictions than a pair of regions of the same size: there
is something about being regions of the same country that is associated with a higher degree of
integration than between equivalently sized countries (after controlling for physical distance and
common language).
An interesting but separate point to our main discourse is to examine this negative relationship
of measured frictions upon the size of the parties. This does not impact upon our main point, which
is the average border effect, because we report this conditional on size. The dependence of frictions
upon size however does not, a priori, have an obvious sign, and we investigate the systematic
negative dependence in Appendix B. There we demonstrate that this slope can be explained purely
as a result of aggregation issues. This justifies the definition of “residual delta” in Figure 3 as the
measured HRI after controlling for size as well as physical distance and common language. This
figure shows that there is almost first order stochastic dominance for regional frictions compared
with EU frictions, and likewise for EU frictions compared with other international frictions.
The difference between these CDFs is another graphical representation of the border effect.
The border effect is the fact that controlling for size, physical distance, and whether there is a
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Figure 2: Scatter plot showing bilateral trade frictions against GDP split by countries and regions
common language, the average international friction is larger than the average within-EU friction,
which itself is larger than the average inter-regional friction.
In fact we believe that the average border effect is even larger than suggested by the coefficients
in Table 1 due to the fact that we have evidence that trade in services is more home biased than
trade in goods, and our data procedure has implicitly assumed that the degree of home bias is the
same in both. We present this evidence in the next subsection.
2.3 Trade in Services
We have reason to suspect that this analysis is conservative due to the treatment of regional
trade in services. The use of goods only inter-regional trade makes comparison between regional
and country level frictions appear less stark than it actually is, and so is a conservative basis for
conducting this comparison. The method we have used to determine a measure of internal and
external trade for the regions that is consistent with the goods and services international trade
matrix, given goods regional trade matrices, is valid if the degree of home bias in trade in services
is the same as the degree of home bias in trade in goods. If services are more home biased, then
our proceedure is conservative: it understates internal trade if there is more home bias in trade in
services than in trade in goods.
We have goods and services trade data for the Canadian Provinces and for Catalonia and the
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Figure 3: Empirical CDF of residual trade frictions between regions and between countries
Basque Country. Therefore we can calculate the HRIs based on both a goods only apportionment
of the Canadian and Spanish trade data, and a goods and services apportionment of this data.
In this way we can infer if the border effect is larger considering goods and services compared to
goods only trade, and if so, how much larger. Table 2 shows the measured HRI based on a goods
and services apportionment, and for a goods trade only apportionment. As we see, every single
region displays more home bias in its trade in services than it does in its trade in goods, and thus
the frictions calculated under the goods only apportionment are higher in every case. The average
of the log differences in frictions is 14%15.
Every single region displays more home bias in its trade in services than it does in its trade
in goods. Therefore, assuming that this is also true of the US states and the other Spanish
Autonomous Communities, then the differences between regional and country level frictions are
actually higher than the figures from Table 1. Assuming these results are representative and can
be applied across the US States and the other Spanish Autonomous Communities, would imply
that average differences in the log of regional and EU country frictions should be higher by an
additional 14%.
15The simple average difference is 17% while the average weighted by the size of the region-rest of country trade
flow is 14%.
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Region Natural Log of Measured HRI
Goods Only Data Goods & Services Data
Alberta 0.888 0.729
British Columbia 1.075 0.837
Manitoba 1.035 0.886
New Brunswick 1.074 0.937
Newfoundland 1.140 1.014
Northwest Territories 1.460 1.195
Nova Scotia 1.176 1.006
Nunavut 1.456 1.264
Ontario 0.867 0.661
Prince Edward Island 1.353 1.185
Quebec 0.929 0.770
Saskatchewan 1.006 0.864
Yukon 1.670 1.353
Catalonia 0.616 0.547
Basque Country 0.640 0.639
Table 2: Measured HRI for regions when apportioning international trade by regional Ratio of
internal to international trade for each region
It is therefore the case that the comparison of country frictions to regional frictions that we have
performed, which shows significant differences even when controlling for obvious contributions to
trade frictions, is a conservative comparison. A further case for the conservatism of the comparison
that we do, is that sales across a border are more likely to be recorded and so we may expect any
data quality issues to bias our results against finding significant differences between regional and
country level frictions.
*********
The body of evidence indicating that regional borders are systematically less frictional than
country borders is very substantial: even controlling for physical distance and common language,
for any given size frictions are systematically lower among regions than among countries (Figure
2). Controlling also for size, country frictions almost first order stochastically dominate regional
ones (Figure 3). Taking into account the treatment of services increases this difference between
regions and countries further. Our analysis is thus completely in line with other analysis that
show that a substantial border effects exist: there is something that happens within countries that
facilitates trade, something that does not happen across countries.
Furthermore, a similar, but smaller, effect is seen when comparing frictions internal and external
to the European Union.
These large border effects, however, do not imply that the economic integration that could be
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achieved by sharing a national state, or in joining the European Union, is as large as these average
differences. For this to be the case, it would have to be that these institutional arrangements cause
trade effects of this magnitude. In reality, who shares and who does not share a state, and who
joins or does not join a trading block, is an endogenous proposition. This endogeneity, and our
proposed method to deal with it, is one of the major contributions of this paper, and we turn to
this in the next section.
3 Endogenous Country Formation
In the following discussion, we frame everything in terms of the region versus country border effect.
The same ideas apply though in considering the impact of trading blocks like the European Union.
The estimated average difference between international frictions and interregional frictions is
large, but this does not mean that eliminating national borders would cause such a large fall in
frictions. This is because who shares and who does not share a state is an endogenous proposition.
This endogeneity means that it is not obvious how to measure the trade enhancing value of sharing
a state.
We have already seen that the measure of trade frictions is positively correlated with physical
distance and with language differentiation. It is likely that it is positively correlated with all
measures of population heterogeneity, and therefore in models of endogenous country formation
such as Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), it would be those pairs who already have a low
trade friction that would select into sharing a state. This means that the average difference between
international and interregional frictions overestimates the causal effect on trade friction reduction
of sharing a state, and thus would overestimate the economic gains from political integration for
an average pair of countries. Given a relationship between low frictions and selection into state
sharing, the econometric estimate for the Regions dummy in Table 1 will be biased towards being
too large (in absolute value).
Suppose that the observed frictions between two entities i and j are a function of intrinsic
characteristics of these regions and of whether they share a political union. We call their innate
characteristics as θi and θj respectively. We denote whether i and j are part of the same country
14
(political union) by sij. We say that sij = 1 if they are, and sij = 0 if they are not, part of the
same country. The innate characteristics of the entities, θi, refer to cultural, social, geographical
aspects that escape economic modelling and that we take as exogenous. These are things that,
at least from the point of view of an economist, are not altered by trade or by sharing a political
union.
It is reasonable to imagine that the frictions between i and j are a function of both entities’
characteristics and of whether they share a national-state:
ln δij = F (θi, θj) + γsij + uij (6)
where γ would be the effect of economic integration, and uij is some noise.
If θi and θj are independent of sij there is no problem with the estimation of equation 6. This
is, loosely, what is shown in Table 1, where F (θi, θj) is the geographic distance between i and j,
common language, etc.
The estimation conducted to obtain Table 1 has two problems, the first trivial but the second
potentially important. The trivial issue is that in our RHS variables we include only a small subset
of the factors θ that may affect trade. It is trivial because, insofar as those missing characteristics
are orthogonal to sij, the estimation of γ remains unbiased.
The substantial problem is that those characteristics (missing or not) are very likely to be
correlated with sij: which entities select into being a country is far from an exogenous proposition.
The probability of the event sij = 1, is very dependent of the affinities and similarities between
the parties. Moreover, these similarities and affinities are also very likely to affect the frictions
irrespectively of the value of sij.
Thus, when we see that regions trade more than countries, this could indicate either that
sharing a political union is a trade-enhancing “technology”, or that regions are regions (and not
countries in our parlance) for precisely the same reason that they have high levels of bilateral trade:
they have deep and special affinities. This is, the probability of sij = 1 is a function of F (θi, θj).
Prob(sij = 1) = G(F (θi, θj))
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In this case the OLS estimation of γ would suffer from upwards bias.
Given that the problem lies in determining the function Prob(sij = 1) = G(θi, θj), an intuitive
approach for solving this problem is to look at the break-up of nations. Head, Mayer, and Ries
(2010) look at the erosion of colonial trade linkages after independence, and find a large fall in
trade: on average, bilateral trade is reduced by more than 60% after 30 years of independence.
However, colonies are unlikely candidates for economies who self-selected into an empire because
of low initial frictions and similarities. Rather these were enforced partnerships that reflected a
large difference in power.
Another possibility is to look at the break-up of countries in the former communist Eastern
Europe. The obvious examples are the break-ups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia16. However
this is not a promising approach because the dynamics can of course be highly idiosyncratic: in
Yugoslavia there was a war; and in any case they occur over timescales in which structural change,
that is not orthogonal to independence, occurs. The set of events comprising the fall of the Soviet
Union, the break-up of the states of the Warsaw Pact, the end of a centralised economy, and
the subsequent membership for the new states into the EU, are not independent events and their
effects can be conflated.
Our approach to control for this endogeneity is also a form of regression discontinuity analysis
which attempts to locate quasi-experiments. The difference is that instead of looking at state-
disolutions and break-ups, we try to identify what we label as “marginal regions” and “marginal
countries”. These are regions of a larger country that could conceivably be independent, and
independent countries that could easily be regions of the larger country. Let i be such a marginal
region, j be the associated marginal country, R be the country of which i is a part, and r be the rest
of this country other than i (this is, R = r
⋃
i) . Then our assumption is that F (θi, θr) ≈ F (θj, θR)
and thus, γ ≈ ln δjR − ln δir. That is, the observed difference in frictions between such entities
should be not dissimilar to the friction reduction that is caused by state sharing. In spite of working
16Following the so-called “Velvet Divorce” of 1993, the share of bilateral trade in total trade fell dramatically,
with the share of total Czech exports going to Slovakia going from 22% to 8%, and the share of total Slovakian
exports going to the Czech Republic going from 42% to 13%. This is not likely simply due to the opening of
trade with the rest of the world following the fall of the Iron Curtain. The same source suggests that the share of
trade between other neighbours from the Eastern bloc, e.g. Poland and Hungary, held up much better, or actually
increased, following the opening up to trade with the rest of the world. HMTreasury (2013).
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with only a small number of examples, we arrive at a conclusion that seems very consistent.17
We define “marginal regions” as regions within the EU with a strong and credible independence
movement. There are three such regions in our dataset: Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque
Country18. We present a methodology for determining the best counterfactual to their trade
frictions with the rest of the country to which they belong, using what we label as the “marginal
country”. We define this as the country in the data with the lowest measured bilateral friction
with the country that would be broken up upon an independence event.
This generates reasonable and interesting examples. We will conduct this exercise in Section 4,
but to give an example of our results, Ireland is determined as the marginal country with respect to
the UK, and therefore functions as the counterfactual for Scotland. The measured frictions between
Ireland and the UK represent a much smaller increase to Scotland’s measured friction with the
rest of the UK than the econometrically determined average estimated in Table 1. It does not
seem reasonable to increase the frictions that Scotland has with the rest of the UK by the average
difference between regional and country frictions when this results in higher frictions than we see
for UK trade with other partners in the data. There are many special affinities between Scotland
and England that it is unreasonable to suspect that all would disappear in the hypothetical case
of independence. And if they do not all disappear they would be fostering trade between Scotland
and England to levels that you would not expect between England and (say) Finland. The causal
effect of a national border between Scotland and the rest of the UK is whatever is left beyond those
special affinities that would not disappear. In other words, we have controlled for the selection
bias on which entities are accounted into the labelling of “countries” and “regions” to the extent
that Scotland and Ireland are otherwise identical vis-a`-vis England.
Thus, we do not propose to increase the magnitude of the frictions by the extra bit that
regions add on average once we control for language, distance and size. Our proposal is to use as
17In any case, the traditional time series approach does not have many other observations either, as the number
of informative instances of country break-up is also extraordinarily small (despite the large increase in membership
of the UN - which is in large degree explained by decolonisation).
18On 18th September 2014 Scotland held an independence referendum in which 45% voted for independence.
The Catalan government in the last few years has made an open push for independence. In recent elections and
polls the pro-independence parties typically get 44% to 50% of the vote and they have a majority of the Catalan
Parliament. In the last elections in the Basque Country 25% of the votes went to a very openly pro-independence
party and a further 35% to a party with serious pro-independence inclinations.
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a counterfactual the lowest friction that we observe in the data that the country has with others.
In the next section we use a structural trade model to evaluate the impact that this conterfactual
experiment has upon income, and label this as the gain from the economic integration that is
caused by sharing a state.
Notice also that this methodology is used to provide an estimate on the causal impact of
either joining or leaving a shared political space. The comparison between “marginal regions”
and “marginal countries” provides the method to do this. Notice that we assume that it can be
applied symmetrically to both the creation and the elimination of borders. The estimate obtained
is our best estimate of this causal effect, and should be applicable in non-marginal cases. So for
example, the difference between the Scottish and Irish trade frictions with the (rest of the) UK
could be applied to Finland’s frictions with the UK to model a hypothetical political integration
of Finland with the UK. This would increase Finnish-UK trade, but not to a level similar to that
of Scotland’s trades with the rest of the UK, because Finland is not a “marginal country” with
respect to the UK, as Finland does not have the same affinities with the UK as Ireland does.
Nevertheless, this increase in Finnish-UK trade is our best estimate of the impact of any putative
political integration between Finland and the UK. In the long run perhaps economic integration
would harmonize these affinities, but this is outside the scope of our exercise. We take affinities
as exogenous. In this sense we may be underestimating the impact of economic integration, but
we have no way of dealing with this, and in any case we would be talking about the very long run
here.
Further, in the long run steady state, it seems reasonable to us that the impact of creating
or eliminating borders should be symmetric. However, this does not imply that the dynamics are
symmetric, and for example it is possible that creating borders could be disruptive with large short
run effects overshooting the steady state impact, whereas eliminating borders may have little short
run impact with a slow approach to the steady state. We have nothing to say on these dynamics.
They are extremely interesting, but beyond the scope of our analysis.
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4 Counterfactual experiments on regional borders
In this section we evaluate the welfare consequences of policy experiments applied to the “marginal
regions” of Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. We evaluate the cost to these regions
of having international borders (though still within-EU borders) with the rest of the country
of which they are part, both using the average econometric estimate, and using our “marginal
country” counterfactual. Our counterfactual approach has a lower impact than imposing the
average difference between country level and regional frictions but, as discussed, the comparison
between marginal regions and the most closely integrated independent countries is much more
informative as to the value of the extra economic integration that comes with political integration.
The history of the literature on the border effect has reduced its importance, with McCallum
(1995) showing a much stronger effect than Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). By controlling
for selection bias we further reduce its importance, but in this section we show that it is still
quantitatively significant. As we shall discuss, our estimates are insensitive to parameters (trade
elasticity) and independent of model specification within a large subset of the gravity class of
modern trade models. We show that the gains from economic integration that come with political
integration are worth between a third and a half of the total gains from trade, relative to autarky,
enjoyed by the regions that we consider.
4.1 No Substitution
Before we conduct our policy experiments, we consider another reason why the difference between
international and inter-regional frictions (both calculated as the econometric average, or as the
difference between marginal countries and marginal regions) could over-estimate the causal impact
of political integration upon economic integration. It could be thought that regions have such
smaller frictions with the rest of the country to which they belong at the expense of larger frictions
with the rest of the world. This “substitution” in frictions could in principle be a reflection that
close ties with a partner foster closer ones with him, but by not interacting with others, you get
further apart from them. In such a case the role of the state for fostering trade integration could
be overstated, even with our way of controlling for endogeneity of country formation.
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(a) Regions are better than expected at trading with their most
integrated trading partner
(b) Regions do not seem to be any worse than expected at trade
with the rest of the world
Figure 4: HRIs with main trading partner and with rest of the world
We investigate this by looking at the three marginal regions of our dataset within a “three
country” framework: the multilateral dataset is aggregated up in each case so that we are con-
sidering the three by three trade matrix involving the region, the rest of its nation, and the rest
of the world. The results of doing this are compared against the equivalent for every country in
the dataset, where the three by three trade matrix now involves the country, its most integrated
trading partner (lowest measured frictions19), and the rest of the world. The results are presented
in Figures 4a and 4b. We can see that the regions have roughly the expected level of trading
frictions with respect to the rest of the world, but lower than expected frictions with their most
integrated trading partner (which is the rest of their nation).
Regions differ from countries in the frictions that they have with their main partner, not in
the frictions that they have with the rest of the world. We do not find that our marginal regions
are systematically less integrated into the global economy than are independent countries of the
same size. It does not seem to be the case that regions are substituting very close trade links
with the rest of their country for slightly closer trade links with all possible partners in the rest
of the world. Instead, the close economic integration across regional borders is on top of normal
trade links with the rest of the world. Therefore the integration benefits of sharing a nation are
apparently additional to the normal integration benefits that countries enjoy within the global
economy.
19We do this after controlling for size since the negative relationship between size and frictions is an aggregation
issue (see Appendix B) rather than a real feature of close integration.
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4.2 Counterfactual exercises
In order to proceed, we need a model in which we can conduct counterfactual analyses. Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) show that there is a map from trade elasticity, , and home
share, λ, to welfare changes, ∆W , in all “gravity models”, and we have seen that there is a
map from trade flows to the HRI measure of trade frictions implied by such gravity models. We
propose to implement policy experiments by changing the HRI measure of trade frictions. However,
to quantify the welfare change under these policy experiements, we need to know how the trade
flows vary with the HRIs. Unfortunately, as shown in Appendix C, there is no general map from
HRIs to trade flows and a model is needed to provide the necessary structure for a specific set of
HRIs to imply a specific set of counterfactual trade flows and incomes. The welfare formula from
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) only allows the welfare change to autarky to be
evaluated - since it is only under autarky that we know the value of the counterfactual home share,
λ′ = 100%.
Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014) state that gravity models in which fixed exporting costs
(if any) are paid in the destination country have a stronger equivalence result. In this case,
counterfactual changes in trade flows are exactly the same as in the Armington model. Since this
equivalence result holds across a fairly wide class of common models used in the international trade
literature, it is a natural benchmark to consider.
However, in the data that we use, reported trade flows include intermediate goods,20 and so we
use an extended version of the Armington model with intermediate goods. Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) note that in “environments with ... tradable intermediate goods ...
our simple welfare formula no longer holds [though] we demonstrate that generalized versions can
easily be derived”. We therefore compute our counterfactual scenarios using our intermediate
goods extended version of the Armington model (see Appendix D)21 in which the welfare formula
20We have found no encompassing regional data reporting trade in value added. Thus, we need to use a model
that incorporates trade of intermediates.
21The results are fairly stable to changes in the model used. A previous version of this paper, Comerford and
Rodr´ıguez-Mora (2014), (as well as using older data) used the basic Melitz (2003) model (which is in the general
class of models described in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012)), and obtained very similar results.
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is:
∆W =
(
λ′
λ
) 1
(1−β)
− 1 (7)
where λ is the non-traded share of output in the data, λ′ is its value in the counterfactual scenario,
 is the trade elasticity (the elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade frictions), and β is the
average share of intermediate goods in total output from Equation (2).
We have detailed regional data, including trade in services, for Scotland, Catalonia, and the
Basque Country as described in Appendix A. We find counterfactual countries for these “marginal
regions” by identifying the least frictional trading partner, the “marginal” country, with respect to
Spain (as a counterfactual for both Catalonia and the Basque Country) and with respect to the UK
(as a counterfactual for Scotland). The independent country that is chosen as the counterfactual
for the corresponding region is the country with the lowest measured HRI with respect to Spain
and the UK. These countries are Portugal and Ireland respectively.
The fact that the counterfactual trading pairs are similar in size to the trading pairs upon
which we are conducting these policy experiments gives further validity to these counterfactual
exercises beyond their intuitive appeal.
The “Average Impact” HRI is the measured HRI for the Region-Rest of Country pair adjusted
by the average border effect. For Catalonia and the Basque Country, we augment the observed
frictions by a factor ASpain obtained from the regional border and Spain coefficients from Table 1,
as well as the 14% trade in services impact from Table 2. For Scotland, we augment the observed
frictions by a factor AUK obtained from the regional border coefficient from Table 1, as well as the
14% trade in services impact from Table 222. Let i be the region, j be the counterfactual, R be
the country of which i is a part, and r be the rest of this country other than i. Thus, we measure
δir and δjR from trade data, define δ
′
jR by adjusting δjR for size and distance
23 using Table 1, and
22The average value of
[
lnδ − (αdist × dist+ αdist2 × dist2 + αlnXX × lnXX)] (where the αs are the relevant
coefficients from Table 1) for the US internal borders is 4.00, while for the Spanish internal borders it is 3.57. The
observed HRI for Scotland is calculated using goods and services data, and so on a consistent basis we add the 14%
figure from Table 2 to it to produce an equivalent goods only figure. Then adjusting for distance and size as above
gives a figure of 3.94 i.e. internal frictions in the UK look much more like those of the US than they do of Spain,
and so we create our “average border effect” counterfactual for Scotland by adjusting by the coefficient on the US
border effect only from Table 1.
23The adjusted counterfactual could also be adjusted for language. However, we believe that it would be prob-
lematic to do this. In the cross country dataset that we use, a pair is deemed to have a common language if they
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define δaveir = δir × eAR .
Trade Frictions Welfare Impact
δir δ
′
jR δ
ave
ir δ
′
jR δ
ave
ir
Scotland (Ireland) 2.067 2.707 2.947 -8.5% -9.8%
Catalonia (Portugal) 1.730 2.990 3.810 -12.5% -13.7%
Basque C. (Portugal) 1.895 3.066 4.174 -16.0% -18.3%
Table 3: Imposing HRIs on regions, with trade elasticity = −3.5
Table 3 shows the measured HRIs for the marginal regions with respect to the rest of the
country of which they are part, the HRIs imposed on these pairs as policy experiments, and the
welfare impact on the marginal regions of performing these policy experiements24.
Notice that the frictions of our “marginal country” counterfactuals are lower than those implied
by an econometric exercise that produces average effects. This is the sense in which our exercise
corrects the selection bias. It would not be reasonable to expect that after a hypothetical Scottish
independence, that the trade frictions between Scotland and England were to become as large as
the ones that the UK has with the average of its other trading partners. The welfare impacts based
on the counterfactual marginal countries are consequently lower than the impact of imposing the
average difference between country and regional frictions.
We rationalise this variation in the impact of the “marginal region” - “marginal country” dif-
share an official language, so Ireland has a common language with the UK, but Portugal does not have a common
language with Spain. Regional pairs are deemed always to have a common language (so the assumption is that
sufficient Spanish is spoken in Catalonia and the Basque Country for them to share a common language with Spain
despite both having local languages. This is a reasonable coding of the data, but strictly following this coding,
we would claim that part of the difference between the Portuguese and the Catalonian or Basque frictions was a
language effect. We believe that this reading of the relative language frictions in the Catalonia/Basque-Portugal
case is incorrect. This is because the business community and professional classes in Portugal can speak Spanish.
Designating both cases as positively having a common language designation is therefore reasonable. Modifying one
data point in the cross country dataset may not be appropriate - either investigate the data closely in each case or
algorithmically code; but sense should be applied when conducting three detailed examples. Note that the purpose
of this exercise is to estimate the value of integration directly induced by political integration. It is of course the
case that political integration has indirect effects like language homogenization, and perhaps Catalonia and the
Basque Country both have a high propensity to cease to have a common language with the rest of Spain if there
were to be no political integration in future. In Catalonia, for instance, all education from pre-school to university
is given only and exclusively in Catalan, irrespectively of parental language. Moreover there are many voices of the
pro-independent movement advocating for Catalan being the solely official language of an independent Catalonia.
In the Basque country it is not 100% of the education, but is the large majority in spite of the Basque language
being largely minoritarian only one generation ago. In any case, all this is a matter of conjecture (for example it
might have been expected that Ireland, upon independence in 1922, would make strong moves away from sharing
a common language with the UK and towards being a solely Gaelic speaking country, but this has not happened)
and is in any case not the issue we seek to investigate or quantify.
24Every figure in this table is of course sensitive to the value chosen for the trade elasticity, here  = −3.5 as
before.
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Home Share Home Share Counterfactual Welfare Impact / cost autarky
Data  = −2.8  = −3.5  = −5.2  = −2.8  = −3.5  = −5.2
Scotland (Ireland) 68% 78% 78% 78% 39% 38% 38%
Catalonia (Portugal) 56% 69% 70% 70% 42% 42% 41%
Basque C. (Portugal) 52% 69% 69% 69% 48% 47% 46%
Table 4: Welfare changes as a proportion of overall gains from trade are insensitive to changes in
the trade elasticity
ference across countries as another point in favour of our proposed method: not only does this
method do as good a job as we are able to do in dealing with this selection bias, it also controls
in some respects for institutional details and country fixed effects. For instance, the fact that the
integration benefit to Spanish regions in being part of Spain is seen to be greater than that of
Scotland in being part of the UK is because Spanish regions seem to be much more integrated into
Spain than Scotland is into the UK.
As well as being sensitive to the value chosen for the trade elasticity, there does not seem to
be much common ground between the welfare figures in Table 3. However, in Table 4 we express
the results of imposing the marginal country friction, δjR, as a counterfactual home share of trade
in GDP, and the welfare loss as a share of the total welfare loss on autarky, for a range of values
of the trade elasticity. We see that the results are remarkably stable. Varying the trade elasticity
makes trade more or less important for welfare, but it is always the case that the gains from trade
associated with sharing a state are a fraction of between a third and a half of the total value of
gains from trade relative to autarky.
This insensitivity of the results to changes in the trade elasticity is implied by insensitivity
of trade flows to the elasticity as described by Section V of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Changing the trade elasticity will change the trade impact of a given change in frictions, or the
welfare impact of a given change in trade. However, conditioning on a counterfactual which is
based on an observation in the data means that different trade elasticities imply different changes
in frictions such that the implied change in trade flows is not greatly affected. Further, whilst the
welfare impact of this implied trade flow change is a strong function of the trade elasticity, it is a
fairly constant proportion of the total gains from trade relative to autarky.
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Figure 5: Scottish real income as a function of the trade friction with the rest of the UK.
Imposing measured Scot-rUK frictions implies no change in Scottish income relative to the data.
Note that infinite frictions with the rest of the UK is not an autarkic Scotland, frictions with the
rest of the world are as measured in the data.
4.3 The incentive to integrate
Finally for this section, we note that income is a convex function of bilateral frictions. Figure 5
shows the level of GDP implied by the model for Scotland as a function of log frictions with the
rest of the UK, relative to the GDP that it has with current frictions. An intuition behind this
convex shape is that it must clearly asymptote to a horizontal line as frictions get very large and
you approach zero bilateral trade: the change from nearly infinite frictions to very large but not
so large frictions will not change trade patterns much once you are not trading at all. Conversely,
the change from medium to small frictions may have a large impact on trade patterns and hence
income.
When two entities are closely integrated (due to high affinities, say) the marginal benefit of
further integration (via political union, say) is larger than it is for entities which are not so
closely integrated (with lower affinities). This supports a selection mechanism whereby pairs with
otherwise lower frictions have a greater incentive to form a unified country than those pairs with
higher frictions. Trade models, in the general class of gravity models, imply greater integration
benefits from marginal reductions in frictions for entities that already have low frictions.
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As an example, in Figure 5 we plot the log frictions that Ireland has with the UK, that Portugal
has with Spain, and the impact that imposing these frictions has on Scottish income. Suppose that
political integration is associated with a reduction in log frictions of size I = 0.1. Then, as can be
seen, the income gain, +2.4%, is higher if we start at the less frictional Ireland-UK position, than
if we start at the more frictional Portugal-Spain position, in which case it is +1.6%.
This lends additional support to the proposition that there will be selection into state sharing
and that econometric estimates of the average difference between regional and international borders
is not appropriate for determining the value of the economic integration generated by political
integration.
5 EU Integration and Brexit
In this section we look at the degree of integration that the EU provides, the potential costs of
losing such integration and the potential benefits of furthering that integration.
We start by performing exercises similar to the ones of the previous section, the difference is
that instead of looking at the creation of hypothetical internal borders within countries of the EU,
we look at the effects of a hypothetical departure from the EU. Or perhaps not that hypothetical,
as the UK voted to leave the European Union and is set to formally do so during 2019.
One could argue that augmenting the frictions between the UK and the rest of the EU by the
average impact estimated in the econometric exercise of Section 2, will overestimate the effects of
Brexit by the same reasons that we exposed in section 3: Britain has belonged to the EU for 45
years because of the large degree of affinities with the rest of EU countries, and those affinities are
not likely to disappear as a consequence of Brexit. We consider a set of counterfactual scenarios
to inform on the potential costs of Brexit.
We then consider the gains provided by the existence of the EU to its members, and what
would be the costs of the dissolution of the EU.
Finally, and for the shake of completeness, we revisit the possibility of independence for Scotland
under different hypothetical arrangements vis a vis the EU.
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δ Country EU δ Country EU
4.229 LUX 1 4.520 PRT 1
4.242 HUN 1 4.521 LVA 1
4.247 MLT 1 4.525 CYP 1
4.290 BEL 1 4.538 FIN 1
4.298 CZE 1 4.550 ITA 1
4.307 SVK 1 4.555 ESP 1
4.313 NLD 1 4.566 GBR 1
4.318 IRL 1 4.640 TUR 0
4.364 DEU 1 4.695 GRC 1
4.369 SVN 1 4.746 RUS 0
4.371 AUT 1 4.944 TWN 0
4.387 EST 1 4.968 KOR 0
4.402 POL 1 4.988 USA 0
4.423 LTU 1 5.006 CAN 0
4.457 DNK 1 5.056 MEX 0
4.463 CHE 0 5.101 CHN 0
4.469 BGR 1 5.101 BRA 0
4.471 SWE 1 5.122 IND 0
4.491 FRA 1 5.137 AUS 0
4.505 ROU 1 5.187 JPN 0
4.508 NOR 0 5.193 IDN 0
4.512 HRV 1
Table 5: Residual Frictions with the EU after controlling for size of both parties. Residuals
frictions with the rest of the Eu if the country belongs to the EU. Residuals frictions given by
ln δ − αlnXX × lnXX, where αlnXX is the coefficient on log (XiXj) from Table 1.
5.1 Brexit Scenarios
A difficulty in trying to make reasonable counterfactuals for the effects of Britain leaving the UK
is the degree of uncertainty on the eventual arrangement. The costs are unlikely to be the same for
staying within the single market (in an EEA type arrangement such as that of Norway) or having
extensive bilateral arrangements that amount to the same (as Switzerland does), as to having the
same frictions that two good neighbors who are both members of the WTO would be expected to
have. In order to clarify matters we produce a set of possible scenarios, measure their impact, and
let the reader use their own criteria for evaluating how reasonable each of these counterfactuals
are.
In Table 5 we order countries by their measured frictions with the EU, once corrected by size.
If the country is a member of the EU, we report its frictions with the rest of the EU. There are two
things to note in this table. First, notice that the UK is amongst the less integrated countries with
the rest of the UK, in the sense than the implied frictions with the rest of the EU are larger than
for all other countries of the EU except Greece. Second, the non EU countries with the smallest
frictions to the EU are Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and Russia (in that order).
As a matter of comparison, in Table 6 we present the result of some counterfactual exercises of
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Mg region⇒Mg country δir ⇒ δ′jR Welfare Change
Austria ⇒ Switzerland 2.654⇒ 2.852 −2.6%
Sweden ⇒ Norway 2.862⇒ 3.032 −1.5%
Poland ⇒ Russia 2.649⇒ 3.290 −5.4%
Bulgaria ⇒ Russia 3.596⇒ 3.593 +0.0%
Romania ⇒ Russia 3.278⇒ 3.474 −1.5%
Greece ⇒ Turkey 3.988⇒ 3.384 +3.3%
Table 6: Some Hypothetical exercises within the EU. Implied effect on GDP of the “marginal
region” of substituting the frictions with the rest of the EU for the frictions that the counterfactual
country (“marginal country”) has with the EU.
the type that we performed in the previous section. Here we define “marginal countries” as non
EU members highly integrated with the EU, and “marginal regions” as the EU countries which
are their most natural counterparts. Notice that Austria “becoming like” Switzerland or Sweden
“becoming like” Norway have relatively small (albeit not insignificant) effects on GDP (of course,
they have larger effects on the size of trade flows with the EU). Poland “becoming like” Russia has
much larger negative consequential effects. The most surprising case is Greece “becoming like”
Turkey, as Turkey trades with more ease with the EU than Greece does. We are skeptical about
this last result, as it might be related to the specific economic circumstances of Greece since 2010,
and in what follows we will ignore comparisons with Greece. In any case, it is informative on the
fact that as countries go, Turkey is relatively well integrated into the EU economy.
In table 7 we report the value of the frictions between “marginal regions and “marginal coun-
tries” in the European context. For Switzerland the natural choice is Austria, and for Norway
it is Sweden. It is not clear what is the natural “Marginal Region” counterpart for Turkey so we
drop this example. The best counterparts for Russia are probably Poland, Bulgaria, or Romania.
Notice that the average differences in log frictions, 0.073625is much lower than the average effect of
the EU on log frictions, which is 0.1444 from Table 1. This is consistent with endogenous selection
into the EU, and suggests that to imply an increase of frictions to be equal to the average effect
of the EU on frictions as a consequence of Brexit could overestimate its effects, as discussed in
section 3.
Thus, we call an increase in the log of EU vs other country frictions of 0.0736, the “causative”
25This is the average of the figures for ‘Austria vs Switzerland’, ‘Sweden vs Norway’, and the average of the three
‘... vs Russia’ figures. The simple average of all 5 figures is 0.0806.
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Marginal Region Marginal Country log difference
Austria vs Switzerland 2.654 2.852 0.0720
Sweden vs Norway 2.862 3.032 0.0575
Poland vs Russia 2.649 3.290 0.2165
Bulgaria vs Russia 3.596 3.593 -0.0007
Romania vs Russia 3.278 3.474 0.0579
Average 0.0736
Table 7: Frictions with the EU of selected countries along with the frictions with the rest of the
EU of selected counterparts.
Counterfactual δUK−EU ∆ of log δ δ′UK−EU Welfare Change
“Causative effect” 2.668 0.0736 2.871 -1.0%
“Average effect” 2.668 0.1444 3.082 -1.7%
Table 8: Counterfactual causative and average effects of Brexit. Implied effect on GDP of the
UK of increasing (log of) frictions with the EU by 0.0736 (“causative effect”) and 0.1444 (average
effect).
effect of the EU on trade frictions. We compare it with the “average” effect of the EU which is the
increase of 0.1444 obtained in Table 1. In Table 8 we show that the “causative” effect of increasing
δUK−EU by the average increase between “marginal regions and countries” in the european context
is a fall of UK GDP of 1.0%, compared with a 1.7% fall as suggested by the average effect.
Notice that the implied “causative” increase in the frictions does not take into account any of
the specificities of the relationship between the UK and the EU. In particular it does not account
for the fact that the UK is a large supplier of financial services to the rest of the Union. Not
only has the UK the largest financial sector share in GDP of all the G7 countries (and more than
twice Germany’s share), but the contribution of UK financial services exports to GDP is also the
highest. This is a sector very sensitive to regulation, and the new political realities in Europe as
a consequence of the UK not having political representation in the Union, open the posibility of
regulatory changes likely to decrease the relative advantage that the UK has now in the sector.
We have seen in section 2.3 that trade in services is typically much more home-biased than goods
trade. It is likely to be the case that this is also the case across the EU border, particularly given
that the political sphere for regulation in those matters lies in Brussels more than in country states.
It seems reasonable to expect regulatory changes making it more difficult for the UK to export
financial services to the EU once the voice of Britain ceases to be heard in Europe and once British
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Mg region⇒Mg country δir ⇒ δ′jR Welfare Change
UK ⇒ USA 2.668⇒ 2.905 −1.1%
UK ⇒ Canada 2.668⇒ 3.674 −2.9%
UK ⇒ Australia 2.668⇒ 4.247 −3.5%
UK ⇒ Russia 2.668⇒ 3.024 −1.5%
Table 9: Counterfactuals for the UK outside Europe. Frictions of the counterfactual “Marginal
Country” are corrected by size, language and distance.
interests are not accounted for in the EU political process. To properly account for those facts lies
beyond the scope of this paper, but those realities should be taken into account when considering
the possible consequences of Brexit.
An alternative, and perhaps more natural, counterfactual for the UK after Brexit are non Eu-
ropean countries that share many cultural, social and political similarities with the UK. Countries
like Canada, USA or Australia. A further natural counterfactual is Russia since post-Brexit, the
UK and Russia will be the two large, culturally European, countries that border the EU. In Table
9 we present the results of the exercise of substituting the frictions that the UK has with the rest
of the union by the frictions that USA, Canada, Australia and Russia have with the EU (after
controlling for size and distance). The effects on UK’s GDP range from decreases of around 1.1%
(if the countarfactual is the USA) to 3.5% (if it is Australia).26
In Figure 6 we summarise these results and show how the welfare impact upon the UK of Brexit
depends on the frictions that the UK may have with the rest of the EU. Not surprisingly it is a
similar to the figure in section 4.3, larger frictions, less trade, worse outcomes, and the gains are
larger the closer you are. There is a difference in magnitudes relative to Figure 4.3 though, since the
Scottish economy is much smaller than the UK’s and it depends much more upon trade (largely
with the rest of the UK). In Figure 6 we mark hypothetical values of δ and the corresponding
welfare imapct upon the UK. The hypothetical frictions that we mark are (1) the frictions that
the UK has currently with the EU. If these were to be the frictions after Brexit (i.e., no change
at all in frictions), there would be of course no change in welfare. (2) The frictions resulting from
adding to the UK-EU frictions, the “causative” effect described above, and the “average” effect
of the EU from Table 1. These result in a loss of about 1.0% and 1.7% of GDP respectively. And
26Notice that this before the implementation of the free trade agreement between Canada and the EU
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Figure 6: UK real income as a function of the trade friction with the rest of the EU.
(3), the US-EU, Russia-EU, Canada-EU and Australia-EU frictions (all translated to the UK-EU
friction by correcting for size and distance). Imputing these frictions to the UK-EU border would
result in a loss to the UK of 1.1%, 1.5%, 2.9% and 3.5% of GDP respectively.
Thus, one can conclude that the steady state effects of Brexit on trade are likely to produce a
significant, albeit by no means disastrous, reduction in British GDP ranging from 1.0% to 3.5%.
This is consistent with other economic estimates which have been generated. Sampson (2017)
surveys the literature and finds that plausible estimates of the costs of Brexit to the UK lie in
the range of 1%− 10% of GDP. For instance, Dhingra, Huang, Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, and
Reenen (2017) find that structural model estimates which only change trading frictions upon Brexit
(such as those conducted in this paper) produce costs in the range 1%− 3%. They also find that
reduced form estimates (which may also reflect trade impacts upon productivity and technology,
capital accumulation and FDI, and immigration) produce costs of Brexit to the UK in the range
6% − 9% of GDP. This is consistent with the arguments in Brooks and Pujolas (2017), which in
a dynmaic general equilibrium trade model produce larger gains from trade than estimates based
on static models, due to the dynamic adjustment of capital. Other estimates of the costs of Brexit
include those of Ebell and Warren (2016) and Ebell, Hurst, and Warren (2016) who run various
Brexit scenarios, and find impacts on GDP of 1%− 4%.
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Figure 7: Welfare effects in all countries of increasing log δ of EU-EU borders by the “causative”
effect, +0.0736, of the EU.
5.2 The Aggregate effects of the EU
The fact that the magnitude of the effects of leaving the EU (from the previous section) are much
smaller than the ones of regions getting independent and both parties remaining in the EU (as
reported in section 4) does not imply that the existence of the EU has small effects on welfare. In
this section we perform counterfactual exercises showing (i) that the effects of the EU on welfare
are considerable, particularly for small countries, but that (ii) the effects of decreasing the frictions
within the EU to those in line with the ones that regions of the same country have between them
could be very very large indeed (again, particularly for small countries).
We first do the exercise of considering that all the countries within the EU increase the frictions
between themselves by the “causative” effect that the EU has on frictions (i.e., an increase of the
log δij of 0.0736 for all country pairs where both i and j belong to the EU). This has three types
of effects: (i) it obviously increases the frictions between the pairs, reducing their welfare, (ii) it
produces general equilibrium aggregate demand effects, as the economies affected by the increase
in frictions sum to a substantial amount of world GDP, and (iii) it produces a change in terms of
trade benefiting non EU countries (whose goods become more demanded as former EU members
have more difficulty trading among themselves). This sums to a decrease of World GDP of 0.3%,
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Figure 8: Welfare effects in all countries of decreasing log δ of EU-EU borders by the “causative”
effect, -0.2700, of within-country level integration.
but this change is very unevenly distributed. Non EU countries have a very small increase of 0.01%
of GDP, while EU GDP suffers a decrease of 1.7%. In Figure 7 we plot the effect for all countries
along with the country size. For small European countries the loss is substantial (close to 5% in
some cases) while for larger countries it is much smaller. In the case of the UK the implied loss is
of 0.95%27.
We next turn to do the opposite exercise. We decrease the log frictions between all pairs of EU
countries by 0.2700, which is the difference in log frictions between Ireland and Scotland vis-a-vis
the UK. We use this difference as it is the smallest of the differences over the three case studies
that we looked at, and so is a conservative estimate of what we propose as the “causative” effect
of integration within a country. That is, we decrease log frictions by 0.2700 whenever both parties
are in the EU. As a consequence, world GDP would increase by a substantial 2.3%, but again this
increase would be unevenly distributed. Countries outside of the EU see a slight decrease in their
27The Brexit only loss for the UK is 0.97%. In the case of EU disintegration following Brexit, we can imagine the
UK suffering the 0.97% loss on Brexit which is then followed on by the disintegration of the EU. When the EU falls
apart, the UK (which is already outside the EU) experiences two offsetting effects: the first is a further fall in GDP
as its EU trading partners suffer a loss and demand from these countries falls; the second is a trade diversion effect
- the EU countries used to trade more with each other, but as their borders become more frictional, some of these
purchases are instead made from non-EU countries. The (positive) trade diversion effect dominates the (negative)
effect of the fall in income of EU countries, and we see that the overall impact of EU integration, -0.94%, is slightly
less bad for the UK than a simple Brexit scenario, -0.97%.
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GDP of 0.1% as a consequence of suffering a real depreciation, while EU GDP increases by 10.9%.
In Figure 8 we plot the effect for all countries along with the country size. The implied increase in
welfare for small European countries is huge, with a smaller but still substantial impact on larger
countries. As a benchmark, for the UK the increase is 6.2%.
The corollary of all this is that, even although the effects of the EU are substantial (because
it decreases frictions between its members), there is a large difference between the frictions across
the countries of the EU, and the friction within countries. Moreover, the welfare implications of
those remaining frictions within countries seem to be almost an order of magnitude larger, and
further integration between EU members could produce large welfare gains.
5.3 Independence and EU membership
As an example of this almost order of magnitude difference between the welfare implications of
within country frictions relative to the frictions between EU members, we revisit the case of Scottish
independence. Following the “No” vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014, this
issue may have been thought to have been resolved for a long period of time. However, with
Scotland voting to “Remain” in the EU, while the UK-wide vote was to “Leave”, in 2016’s Brexit
Referendum, Brexit has pushed the issue of Scottish independence back on to the political agenda.
In this subsection we consider the “choice” now facing Scotland between “Brexit-ing” the EU along
with the rest of the UK, or opting for independence and remaining within the EU. In Table 10 we
report the implied changes in Scottish and rUK GDP for these two different policy experiments.
The first row conveys Brexit, while Scotland remains in the UK. The frictions for both Scotland
and the rest of the UK with the rest of the EU increase by the “causative” effect (increase log δ by
0.0736) while the frictions between Scotland and the rest of the UK remain as calibrated with the
data28. The loss for the rest of the UK is 1.0% (about the same size as the loss for the whole of the
UK that we saw before in Table 8, which makes sense given the small size of Scotland relative to
28To do this we assume that Scottish external trade is split between the EU and the rest of the world in the same
proportion as that of the UK as a whole. We only have export data split by destination for Scotland and in this
data Scotland exports 43% of total international exports to the rest of the EU. This is very similar to the UK figure
of 42%. In the exercises we do, it is both exports and imports that matter, and we have no data on the source of
Scottish imports. Therefore we split Scottish external trade into rEU and RoW using the split that we see in the
UK figures.
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δSct−rUK δrUK−rEU δSct−rEU Scotland rUK
(1) Brexit, no independence 2.067 2.882 4.254 -0.8% -1.0%
(2) Brexit, independence in EU 2.707 2.882 3.952 -8.4% -1.7%
(3) Brexit, independence in EU 2.914 2.882 3.952 -9.6% -1.8%
(4) Brexit, independence out of the EU 2.914 2.882 4.254 -10.5% -1.8%
Table 10: Implied Welfare Changes for Scotland and the rest of the UK of (1) Brexit without
Scottish independence, (2) Brexit & independence (Irish friction) while Scotland remains in the
EU, (3) Brexit & independence (augmented Irish friction) while Scotland remains in the EU, and
(4) Brexit & independence with Scotland out of the EU
the UK), while the loss for Scotland is slightly smaller, 0.8%, due to it being less open to foreign
trade than the rest of the UK.
The second row of Table 10 is to (i) increase the frictions between the rest of the UK and the
EU in the same manner as before, (ii) to make the frictions between Scotland and the rest of the
UK equal to the ones the UK has with Ireland like in section 4, and (iii) while leaving the frictions
between Scotland and the EU intact. Thus, this scenario accounts for Scottish independence from
the UK, and accession as an independent member state of the EU. This leads to a much larger loss
in GDP for Scotland, of 8.4%29 and a larger loss in GDP for rUK of 1.7% - which has suffered the
double effect of Brexit (cost of around 1.0%) and increased trade frictions with Scotland (implied
cost of around 0.7% of GDP).
Notice however that in this second row we have increased the frictions between Scotland and
the rest of the UK “only” to the level that Ireland has with the UK now, while the UK is a member
of the EU. Were we to increase this friction further (by the additional “causative” effect of the
EU) then we see in the third row that losses are now even larger.
Finally, and for completeness, in the 4th row we show the impact of Scottish independence and
Brexit if Scotland does not remain within the EU. Clearly in this case the losses are again larger.
The loses for Scotland associated with Brexit are almost an order of magnitude smaller than
29Notice again that this is a smaller loss than the 8.5% loss from the Scottish independence scenario considered
in Table 3. This is because “after” suffering an 8.5% GDP loss on independence, Scotland then benefits marginally
from trade diversion effects as rUK leaves the EU.
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the loses associated with severing the within-country levels of integration that Scotland has with
the rest of the UK. The moral of this exercise is that even controlling for endogeneity effects in
the formation of countries, country borders have very large implications for trade frictions, even
within the European Union. Their effects are much larger than the, still significant, effects of the
European Union. A corrollary of this is that there are large gains from trade still available in
making the EU look like an integrated country in trade terms, though the political direction of
travel seems to be very much against this at the moment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented evidence, consistent with the economic literature on the border
effect, that regional borders are less frictional to trade than international borders (Table 1), even
within the EU. Our econometric exercise can be used to construct policy experiments that provide
an estimate of the welfare costs of changing regional borders to international borders (via political
independence) or leaving the EU (i.e., Brexit) in standard gravity models of trade (Table 3).
However, we believe that this “average” border effect overestimates the impact of sharing a
state: it is reasonable to expect that affinities that promote trade also promote selection into
sharing a state. This means that it is likely that entities with otherwise low frictions “choose”
to share a state and enjoy the integration benefit, whereas entities with high frictions “choose”
to be independent countries. The average difference between borders within and across countries
therefore overstates this integration benefit because of this selection bias. The same mechanism is
likely to exist for selection into (or out of) organizations like the EU.
We propose a methodology to deal with this selection bias: identify “marginal regions” as those
regions in our data with credible independence movements; and “marginal countries” with respect
to country R as those countries with the lowest measured frictions with R; then the difference in
frictions between a marginal region of country R and the marginal country with respect to country
R, is a better estimate of the true economic integration benefit due to political integration than the
average difference between regional and country borders. This is akin to performing a regression
discontinuity analysis. By controlling for this selection bias, we reduce the estimated integration
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benefit in the case of Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Nevertheless, the estimates
that we obtain are still very large indeed. Likewise by the same logic we estimate a cost of Brexit
lower than that obtained by imputing the average difference in frictions between EU and non EU
countries.
The history of the literature on the border effect has reduced its importance, with McCallum
(1995) showing a much stronger effect than Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). By controlling
for selection bias we further reduce its importance, but a central claim of our paper is that it is
still quantitatively significant. Our estimates are insensitive to parameters (trade elasticity) and
insensitive to model specification (e.g. inclusion of intermediate goods) across a broad class of
models from modern trade theory, and they tell the same story across the three examples that
are in our data set: the gains from economic integration that come with political integration are
worth between a third and a half of the total gains from trade, relative to autarky, enjoyed by
these regions (Table 4). This large proportion of total gains from trade is a consequence of the
extraordinary degree of integration that a region has with the rest of its country. Despite the EU
being a trade promoting body, with quantitatively significant benefits, we do not observe the same
degree of integration between countries, even within the European Union.
The differential trade promoting effects of sharing a country have consequences that are almost
an order of magnitude larger than consequences of the differential effects of mutual EU membership.
These consequences translate into large potential gains in welfare. These are the gains from
economic integration that institutions like the European Union should strive to obtain.
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Appendices
A Data
A.1 Country Data
• WIOT2014 Nov16 ROW.xlsb downloaded from http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16 - World
Input-Output Tables, 2016 Release, WIOT 2014 link.
• This gives GDP, Gross Output and total (goods and services) bilateral trade flows for 2014, for 43
countries plus a rest of the world aggregate.
• Data on distance and common language etc, geo cepii.xls and dist cepii.xls, downloaded from
GeoDist http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6
A.2 US Data
• US State GDP for 2014, from Bureau of Economic Analysis https://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.
cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=10&isuri=1&7003=200&7035=-1&7004=naics&7005=1&7006=
xx&7036=-1&7001=1200&7002=1&7090=70&7007=2014&7093=levels
• State Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
US total GrossOutput× StateGDP/∑StateGDPs
• 2014 trade flows (goods only) between states and internationally from the Freight Analysis Frame-
work http://faf.ornl.gov/fafweb/Extraction1.aspx
• State International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
US International Trade× State International Trade/∑States International Trade
• State Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
US International Trade× State Internal Trade/∑States International Trade
• Geographical data taken from http://bl.ocks.org/sjengle/5315515
A.3 Canadian Data
• 2013 Data obtained from Statistics Canada by downloading cansim-3860003-eng-5409715410633866536.csv
from http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=3860003&tabMode=
dataTable&p1=-1&p2=-1&srchLan=0&pattern=trade
• This gives GDPs and bilateral trade flows (either goods only, or goods and services) internally and
internationally.
• Provincial Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian total GrossOutput× ProvinceGDP/∑ProvinceGDPs
• Provincial International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian International Trade×Province International Trade/∑Provinces International Trade
• Province Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian International Trade× Province Internal Trade/∑Provinces International Trade
• Geographical data: “canada provinces.csv” downloaded from https://www.webtrees.net/index.
php/en/add-ons/category/5-gm-files
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A.4 Scottish Data
• Scottish and UK GDP for 2014 obtained from “GERS” publication: 00523728.xlsx downloaded
from http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00523728.xlsx
• Scottish Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
UK total GrossOutput×GERS ScottishGDP/GERS UK GDP
• Goods and services trade with rest of UK and with rest of the world from Scottish Government’s
Input-Output (IO) tables for 2014. These tables also give a measure of Scottish Gross Output.
00522788.xlsx downloaded from http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00522788.xlsx
• Scottish Trade with i (i = rUK or RoW ) used in constructing the dataset is
ScottishGrossOutput× Scottish IO Tradewith i/Scottish IOGrossOutput
• rUK trade withRoW used in constructing the dataset is UK TradewithRoW−Scottish TradewithRoW
• Scottish exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using Ex-
port Statistics Scotland 2015 data for 2014 for use in Herfindahl calc: 00526194.xlsx dowloaded from
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSExcel
• Geographical data: coordinates for Edinburgh obtained from google search.
A.5 Spanish Data
• Autonomous Community GDPs in 2006 from Eurostat (”Regional gross domestic product by NUTS
2 regions - million EUR, Code: tgs00003”)
• A.C. Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish total GrossOutput×A.C.GDP/∑A.C.GDPs
• Goods only trade data, as at 2006, for all Spanish Autonomous Communities in terms of imports
and exports to the rest of Spain and internationally, from C-Intereg 2008: Table 6 on p28 of http://
www.c-intereg.es/El_Comercio_Interregional_en_Espa%C3%B1a_1995-2006_29_10_08.pdf
• Provincial International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish International Trade×A.C. International Trade/∑A.C. International Trade
• A.C. Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish International Trade×A.C. Internal Trade/∑A.C. International Trade
• Geographical data: Regional capital coordinates for Spanish autonomous communities obtained
from individual google searches.
A.6 Catalonia
• Goods and services trade (G&S) data with rest of Spain and with rest of the world as at 2005 is
available from Comptes econo`mics simplificats de l’economia catalana 2005
• Catalan Gross Output and International trade are as calculated using the Spanish A.C. (AC) data
above
• Catalan Internal trade used here is
Catalan (AC) International Trade×Catalan (G&S) Internal Trade/Catalan (G&S) Internal Trade
• Catalan exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using the split
for Spain as a whole, for use in Herfindahl calc.
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A.7 Basque Country
• Goods and services trade (G&S) data with rest of Spain and with rest of the world as at 2006 is
available from http://en.eustat.es/elementos/ele0010000/ti_Gross_Domestic_Product_of_
the_Basque_Country_by_components_Supply_and_demand_Current_prices_thousands_of_euros_
2005-2012a/tbl0010072_i.html#axzz2vHsbZzjnexpressed
• Basque Gross Output and International trade are as calculated using the Spanish A.C. (AC) data
above
• Basque Internal trade used here is
Basque (AC) International Trade×Basque (G&S) Internal Trade/Basque (G&S) Internal Trade
• Basque exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using the split
for Spain as a whole, for use in Herfindahl calc.
B Negative Relationship Between Size and Measured Fric-
tions
It is obvious that trade frictions should depend positively on physical distance, and negatively on whether
the entities have a common language. But it is much less obvious why there should be a significant
dependence on the size of the entities. In this section we will show that aggregation can explain this
negative dependence. To this end, we conduct the following exercise. We assume the existence economies,
and fix their trade patterns. We then view these economies at different scales of aggregation (for small
or large “countries”) and examine how the measured HRI changes with scale.
Suppose a large number, N , of very small, identical economies. Within these very small economies,
there are no trade frictions. Each of these economies has gross output, Y , and home trade share, λ,
and every bilateral pair in this world is associated with the same trade friction, δ¯ > 1 and consequently,
trade flow X. We can then look at aggregations of these small units. Suppose the underying small
economies are indexed 1, ..., N but that we can only observe aggregations (“countries”) K = {1, ..., k}
and M = {k + 1, ..., k + m < N}. Then we want to examine the relationship between the size of these
aggregations/countries, k & m, and the measured HRI between them. We are imposing the same frictions
between any two fundamental units and no extra friction for trade across the border of the data gathering
units , K & M . Therefore, if the measured HRI reflected only true trade frictions then it should be
independent of k & m. On the other hand, if there is a relationship, does it explain the slope in Figure
2, or does this figure show some true relationship between size and HRI?
We can solve for the bilateral trade flow X between each unit, in terms of the home share λ, the true
bilateral trade friction δ¯, the gross output Y , and the trade elasticity , by manipulating Equation (1):
δ¯ =
(
X2
(Y − (N − 1)X)2
) 1
2
& λ =
Y − (N − 1)X
Y
⇒ X = λY δ¯
Now consider the case where we cannot observe these small identical units, but instead the observed
actual countries are aggregrations K = {1, ..., k} and M = {k+1, ..., k+m} of non-overlapping underlying
3
“countries”. In this case:
YK = kY
YM = mY
XKK = kλY + k(k − 1)X
XMM = mλY +m(m− 1)X
XKM = kmX = XMK
If we now measure the HRI associated with this KM bilateral relationship, we obtain
ln δKM =
1

ln
(
XKM
X
1/2
KKX
1/2
MM
)
=
1

ln
(
k1/2m1/2δ¯
(1 + (k − 1)δ¯)1/2(1 + (m− 1)δ¯)1/2
)
Differentiating ln δKM by lnYK and evaluating this at k = 1 gives
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYK
=
∂ ln δKM
∂ ln k
=
1
2
(
1− δ¯
k
1 + (k − 1)δ¯
)
< 0
i.e.
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYK
(k = 1) =
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYM
(m = 1) =
1− δ¯
2
< 0
Therefore, purely from aggregation effects rather than any real frictions, we would expect to observe a
negative relationship between the log of the HRI and log incomes with a slope in the range 12 < 0 (for high
values of δ¯) to 0 (for a value of δ¯ ≈ 1). This range, given the value  = −3.5 used to generate Figure 2, is
(−0.142, 0). The empirically observed slope shown in Figure 2 is −0.103. There is therefore no evidence
of any true relationship between size and HRI, with the negative slope being within the expected range.
The intuition for this negative dependence of HRI upon size is that the HRI measure is a relative
measure: it measures the friction for trade with the other party relative to trade with yourself. Larger
countries have larger internal trade frictions and so a lower relative increase in frictions with external
entities. Ramondo, Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Sabor´ıo-Rodr´ıguez (2014) provide a model for internal frictions
which deals with this effect. Doing this requires additional data, and in a simple and parsimonious
specification like that used in this paper, we cannot separately identify the productivity of the economies
from their internal trade frictions. We can however control for this phenomenon by looking at the residual
over and above what we expect given size effects.
We expect frictions to depend positively on physical distance, and negatively on a common official
language. We have now shown30 that we also expect frictions to depend negatively upon the incomes
of the trading partners due to aggregation. We now look at the residual frictions controlling (via the
regression coefficents from Table 1) for these three factors.
C HRI destroys information: need for a model
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) show that there is a map from trade elasticity and home
share to welfare in all “gravity models”, and we have seen that there is a map from trade flows to the HRI
measure of trade frictions. We propose to change the HRI measure of trade frictions based on plausible
counterfactuals. However, to quantify the welfare change under these counterfactual experiements, we
need to know how the trade flows vary with the HRIs. Unfortunately, as we now show, the map from
trade flows to HRIs is not bijective and so we need to propose a model to determine our counterfactual
trade flows. The Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) formula only allows the welfare change
to autarky to be evaluated - since under autarky we automatically know what the trade flows must be.
30Coughlin and Novy (2011) also make this point.
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Define
xi (j) = ln
Xij
Xii
so
xi (i) = 0
and
Aij = Aji ≡ 2ε ln δij = xi (j) + xj (i)
Write in matrix form:
0 A12 ... A1n
A12 0 ... A2n
... ... ... ...
A1n A2n ... 0
 =

0 x1 (2) + x2 (1) ... x1 (n) + xn (1)
x2 (1) + x1 (2) 0 ... x2 (n) + xn (2)
... ... ... ...
xn (1) + x1 (n) xn (2) + x2 (n) ... 0

i.e. A = X + X ′ is a mapping from n(n − 1) pieces of information, {x1 (2) , ..., x1 (n) , x2 (1) , ..., x2 (n) ,
..., xn (1) , ..., xn (n− 1)}, into n(n−1)/2 piece of information,
{
A12, ..., A1n, A23, ..., A2n, ..., A(n−1)n
}
. We
can therefore conclude that the HRI destroys some of the trade flow information. In order to recover
trade flows from a counterfactual set of HRIs, we need to impose a specific gravity model.
D Armington Model with Intermediate Goods
Extending Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (which in turn follows from Anderson (1979)) to include
intermediate goods.
• Let h, j ∈ {1, ..., N} index countries in the multilateral trade database
• Let ihj + chj ≡ the real quantity of goods used in j that were produced in h. These goods as far as
j is concerned have a unit cost of phδhj (δjj = 1 & δhj > 1 for h 6= j). The real quantity of goods
supplied by h to j however is δhj (ihj + chj) at unit cost pi. The expenditure from j on h goods is
therefore phδhj (ihj + chj) no matter where viewed from.
• Production is Cobb-Douglas with share β on intermediate goods (CES aggregate of all produced
goods with elasticity of substitution σ), and share 1− β on the ”real endowment of inputs”, Sj , in
economy j (endowment-ish economy i.e. Sj (which is like the supply of effective labour) does not
change when implementing policy experiments). Output goods are priced at pj
i.e. Nominal Gross Output ”production function”
Xj = pjS
1−β
j
[∑
h
i
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
β = pjS1−βj Iβj
and Nominal Gross Output by destination of goods produced
Xj = pj
∑
h
δjh (ijh + cjh)
≡
∑
h
Xjh
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But balanced trade also implies
Xj =
∑
h
Xhj
=
∑
h
phδhj (ihj + chj)
where the c’s are disaggregated consumption goods and i’s are disaggregated intermediate goods
• Nominal GDP (Expenditure)
Yj = PjCj =
∑
h
phδhjchj
Nominal GDP (Income)
Yj = Xj −
∑
h
phδhjihj
• Utility Uj is equal to real consumption Cj which is CES aggregation (elasticity of substitution σ)
of disaggregated goods
Cj =
[∑
h
c
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
• Utility maximisation taking prices and income as given
0 =
∂
∂chj
[∑
h
c
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
+ λj
(
Yj −
∑
h
phδhjchj
)
= C
1
σ
j c
− 1
σ
hj − λjδhjph
i.e. chj = (λjδhjph)
−σ Cj
i.e. δhjph =
1
λj
(
chj
Cj
)− 1
σ
• Utility maximisation also gives us the price level in j
Yj = PjCj =
∑
h
phδhjchj
=
∑
h
phδhj (λjδhjph)
−σ Cj
= Cjλ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
i.e. Pj = λ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
6
Yj = PjCj = Pj
[∑
h
c
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
= Pj
[∑
h
(
(λjδhjph)
−σ Cj
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
= PjCjλ
−σ
j
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] σ
σ−1
i.e. λσj =
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] σ
σ−1
Pj = λ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
=
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
]− σ
σ−1 ∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
=
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
Pj =
1
λj
• Economy j spends P ′jIj on intermediate goods i.e.
P ′jIj =
∑
h
phδhjihj
Given this level of expenditure, economy j will want to maximise the quantity of the aggregate
intermediate good that it purchases i.e.
0 =
∂
∂ihj
[∑
h
i
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
+ χj
(
P ′jIj −
∑
h
phδhjihj
)
= I
1
σ
j i
− 1
σ
hj − χjδhjph
i.e. ihj = (χjδhjph)
−σ Ij
i.e. δhjph =
1
χj
(
ihj
Ij
)− 1
σ
7
P ′jIj =
∑
h
phδhjihj
=
∑
h
phδhj (χjδhjph)
−σ Ij
= Ijχ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
i.e. P ′j = χ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
P ′jIj = P
′
j
[∑
h
i
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
= P ′j
[∑
h
(
(χjδhjph)
−σ Ij
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
= P ′jIjχ
−σ
j
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] σ
σ−1
i.e. χσj =
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] σ
σ−1
P ′j = χ
−σ
j
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
=
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
]− σ
σ−1 ∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
=
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
P ′j =
1
χj
= Pj
i.e.
ihj =
(
1
Pj
δhjph
)−σ
Ij
δhjph = Pj
(
ihj
Ij
)− 1
σ
Use cost minimisation i.e. an economy that produces Xj does so minimising the cost of doing this.
The cost of intermediaries is ∑
h
phδhjihj = PjIj
8
then the income version of GDP expression implies that the ”cost” of the endowment is GDP i.e.
Xj = Yj + PjIj
If using a unit of the endowment has a price Wj then
Yj = WjSj
i.e.
0 =
∂
Sj
[
WjSj + PjIj + µj
(
Xj − pjS1−βj Iβj
)]
= Wj − µj (1− β) pjS−βj Iβj
= Wj − µj (1− β) Xj
Sj
i.e. µj =
WjSj
(1− β)Xj =
Yj
(1− β)Xj
0 =
∂
Ij
[
WjSj + PjIj + µj
(
Xj − pjS1−βj Iβj
)]
= Pj − µjβXj
Ij
i.e. µj =
PjIj
βXj
Yj =
1− β
β
PjIj
Yj = (1− β)Xj
which means that
Xjj = Xj −
∑
h6=j
Xjh
=
Yj
1− β −
∑
h6=j
Xjh
Then get
ihj =
(
1
Pj
δhjph
)−σ
Ij
ihj
chj
=
Ij
Cj
=
Xj − Yj
Yj
=
β
1− β
9
• Nominal expenditure of economy j in economy i
Xhj ≡ phδhj (ihj + chj)
= phδhjchj
(
1
1− β
)
=
(
1
1− β
)
p1−σh δ
1−σ
hj P
σ−1
j Yj
• Deriving gravity equation
Xh =
∑
k
Xhk = p
1−σ
h
(
1
1− β
)∑
k
δ1−σhk P
σ−1
k Yk
i.e. p1−σh =
Yh∑
k δ
1−σ
hk P
σ−1
k Yk
Xhj =
(
1
1− β
)
p1−σh δ
1−σ
hj P
σ−1
j Yj
=
(
1
1− β
)
Yh∑
k δ
1−σ
hk P
σ−1
k Yk
δ1−σhj P
σ−1
j Yj
=
1
1− β
YhYj
Ph
∑
k
(
Ph
Pk
)−σ
δ1−σhk
(
Yk
Pk
) (Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
=
1
1− β
YhYj
Dh
(
Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
where
Dh = Ph
∑
k
(
Ph
Pk
)−σ
δ1−σhk
(
Yk
Pk
)
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
(DhDj)
1
2
δ1−σhj
• In logs
lnXhj = − ln (1− β) + lnYh + lnYj − 1
2
lnDh − 1
2
lnDj + (1− σ) ln δhj
i.e. the Trade Elasticity, ε = 1− σ
• Price index in country 1, P1, is assumed to be normalised to 1.
• If we impose a large degree of symmetry on the model (Xhj = Xjh & δhj = δjh) then it beccomes
very easy to calibrate and to simulate
• Output price in other countries given by following:
Pj =
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
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Xhj = Xjh & δhj = δjh =⇒
1
1− β
YhYj
Dh
(
Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
=
1
1− β
YjYh
Dj
(
Pj
Ph
δjh
)1−σ
Pj
Ph
=
(
Dj
Dh
) 1
2(1−σ)
allows us to say
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
(DhDj)
1
2
δ1−σhj
then
δhh = 1
Xhh =
1
1− β
YhYh
Dh
(
Ph
Ph
δhh
)1−σ
=
Y 2h
(1− β)Dh
i.e. Dh =
Y 2h
(1− β)Xhh
So
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
Dh
((
Dj
Dh
)− 1
2(1−σ)
δhj
)1−σ
=
1
1− βYhYjD
− 1
2
h D
− 1
2
j δ
1−σ
hj
i.e. δhj =
(
(1− β)Xhj (DhDj)
1
2
YhYj
) 1
1−σ
=
(
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
and
P 1−σj = P
1−σ
k
(
Dj
Dk
) 1
2
=
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
Since data, {Yh, Xhj}, gives Dh & hence δhj , and given the normalisation P1 = 1, this is a system
of N linear equations in N unknowns,
{
p1−σ1 , p
1−σ
2 , ..., p
1−σ
N
}
P 1−σ1
(
Dj
D1
) 1
2
=
(
Dj
D1
) 1
2
=
∑
h
(δh1ph)
1−σ
• If we are just estimating the gravity equation emprically, then use
Xhj =
1
1− βYhYjD
− 1
2
h D
− 1
2
j δ
1−σ
hj
i.e. lnXhj = − ln (1− β) + lnYh + lnYj − 1
2
lnDh − 1
2
lnDj + (1− σ) ln δhj
or
lnXhj − lnYh + lnYj = α0 + αhdh + αjdj + [β1E1 + ...+ βmEm]
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or
lnXhj − lnYh + lnYj + ln (1− β) = αhdh + αjdj + [β1E1 + ...+ βmEm]
where we take GDPs over to LHS to ensure unitary coefficients (and can take constant over to LHS
to ensure it reflects GDP to GO ratio, and run regression with no constant), and where dk is a
dummy variable for country k, and where El, l ∈ {1, ...,m} are m explanations, including existence
of a border, for bilateral trade frictions. Note that the coefficients on the explanations for trade
frictions depend upon elasticity, σ.
• Example with 3 countries
– Calibration: data & parameters
Y1, Y2, Y3
X12 = X21, X13 = X31, X23 = X32
X11 =
Y1
1− β −X12 −X13
X22 =
Y2
1− β −X12 −X23
X33 =
Y3
1− β −X13 −X23
σ, δ11 = δ22 = δ33 = 1
Equations:
D1 =
Y 21
(1− β)X11
D2 =
Y 22
(1− β)X22
D3 =
Y 23
(1− β)X33
δ12 =
(
X212
X11X22
) 1
2(1−σ)
δ13 =
(
X213
X11X33
) 1
2(1−σ)
δ23 =
(
X223
X22X33
) 1
2(1−σ)
P1 = 1 (normalisation)
1 = (δ11p1)
1−σ + (δ21p2)1−σ + (δ31p3)1−σ(
D2
D1
) 1
2
= (δ12p1)
1−σ + (δ22p2)1−σ + (δ32p3)1−σ(
D3
D1
) 1
2
= (δ13p1)
1−σ + (δ23p2)1−σ + (δ33p3)1−σ
12
 p1−σ1p1−σ2
p1−σ3
 =
 1 δ1−σ12 δ1−σ13δ1−σ12 1 δ1−σ23
δ1−σ13 δ
1−σ
23 1
−1

1(
D2
D1
) 1
2(
D3
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 = P
1−σ
1
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
=
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
P 1−σ3 = P
1−σ
1
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
=
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
Ij =
β
1− β
Yj
Pj
Yj
1− β = Xj = pjS
1−β
j I
β
j = pjS
1−β
j
(
β
1− β
Yj
Pj
)β
Sj =
Yj
1− β
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
)− β
1−β
Wj =
Yj
Sj
– Policy experiment: data and parameters
σ
S1, S2, S3 (exogenous supply)
δ11 = δ22 = δ33 = 1
δ12 = δ21, δ13 = δ31, δ23 = δ32 (pol exp)
P1 = 1 (normalisation)
8 Unknowns
{p1,p2, p3, P2, P3, D1, D2, D3}
8 Equations  p1−σ1p1−σ2
p1−σ3
 =
 1 δ1−σ12 δ1−σ13δ1−σ12 1 δ1−σ23
δ1−σ13 δ
1−σ
23 1
−1

1(
D2
D1
) 1
2(
D3
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 =
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
P 1−σ3 =
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
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where D’s must satisfy:
D1 = P1
[
Y1
P1
+
(
P1
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ12
Y2
P2
+
(
P1
P3
)−σ
δ1−σ13
Y3
P3
]
D2 = P2
[(
P2
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ21
Y1
P1
+
Y2
P2
+
(
P2
P3
)−σ
δ1−σ23
Y3
P3
]
D3 = P3
[(
P3
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ31
Y1
P1
+
(
P3
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ32
Y2
P2
+
Y3
P3
]
with
Yj = Sj (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
Wj = (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
– Welfare impact: (
Y ′i /P
′
i
Yi/Pi
)
− 1
where dashed quantities are in policy experiment and undashed quantities are in the calibra-
tion.
– Counterfactual trade flows given by
Xjj =
Y 2j
(1− β)Dj
Xhj =
1
1− βYhYjD
− 1
2
h D
− 1
2
j δ
1−σ
hj
D.1 Welfare formula
• Data
– Home share, λ
λ =
X11
X1
=
X1 −X12
X1
– Normalise GDP i.e.
Y1 = 1 = (1− β)X1
– i.e.
X1 =
1
1− β
X11 =
λ
1− β
X12 =
1− λ
1− β
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• Have, from gravity equations
X11 =
1
1− βY1Y1D
−1
1
i.e. D1 =
1
1− β
1
X11
=
1
λ
X12 =
1
1− βY1Y2D
− 1
2
1 D
− 1
2
2 δ
1−σ
=
λ
1
2
1− β
Y2
D
1
2
2
δ1−σ =
1− λ
1− β
X22 =
1
1− βY2Y2D
−1
2
i.e.
Y2
D
1
2
2
= X
1
2
22 (1− β)
1
2
so
δ =
 1− λ
λ
1
2X
1
2
22 (1− β)
1
2
 11−σ
which is the same as
δ =
(
X212
X11X22
) 1
2(1−σ)
i.e. X22 =
X212
X11
δ−2(1−σ)
=
(1− λ)2
λ (1− β) δ2(1−σ)
also have
D2 =
Y 22
X22 (1− β)
• Adding up in 2nd economy
Y2
1− β = X2 = X22 +X12
D2 =
Y 22
X22 (1− β) = (1− β)
(X22 +X12)
2
X22
= (1− β) (X22 +X12)
2
X22
= (1− β)
(
(1−λ)2
λ(1−β)δ2(1−σ) +
1−λ
1−β
)2
(1−λ)2
λ(1−β)δ2(1−σ)
=
(
1− λ+ λδ2(1−σ))2
λδ2(1−σ)
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• Then 5 Equations
1 = p1−σ1 + δ
1−σp1−σ2(
D2
D1
) 1
2
= δ1−σp1−σ1 + p
1−σ
2 1(
D2
D1
) 1
2
 = [ 1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
] [
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
[
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
=
[
1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
]−1  1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 =
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
where D’s must satisfy:
D1 = P1
[
Y1
P1
+
(
P1
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ
Y2
P2
]
D2 = P2
[(
P2
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ
Y1
P1
+
Y2
P2
]
with
Yj = Sj (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
Wj = (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
• i.e. [
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
=
[
1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
]−1  1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

=
1
1− δ2(1−σ)
[
1 −δ1−σ
−δ1−σ 1
] 1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

p1−σ1 =
1
1− δ2(1−σ)
(
1− δ1−σ
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
)
= λ
so
p1 = λ
1
1−σ
then
1
1− ββ
− β
1−β λ
− 1
1−σ
1
1−β = S1
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• Policy experiment is δ →∞
• In this case p1 = 1 so
Y ′1 = S1 (1− β) (β)
β
1−β
= λ
− 1
1−σ
1
1−β
• i.e. welfare change is (
Y ′
Y
)
− 1 = λ− 11−σ 11−β − 1
=
(
1
λ
) 1
(1−β)(1−σ)
− 1
as required.
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